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APPLICATION OF HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING
IN REDUCING HUMAN ERROR IN EXISTING OFFSHORE SYSTEMS

1.0

INTRODUCTION

Human factors engineering (HFE) is the scientific and engineering discipline concerned with
improving human performance and reducing human error in complex systems. HFE represents
a merging of behavioral science and systems engineering and is directed at integrating people
into the workplace. The discipline had its start in the aviation and aerospace industries.
The objective of HFE is to minimize the potential for human error and accidents by ensuring that
the human can perform assigned activities as efficiently and effectively as possible. At a very
basic level, a definition of human error can be “any deviation from expected human
performance” (Senders and Moray 1991).“ Other definitions exist that have a qualifier of human
error include, such as “failure to respond to a situation within time constraints, responding with
insufficient precision of control, or deciding upon inappropriate courses of action.” Example of
human error is:
•

Starting the wrong pump

•

Skipping a step in a procedure

•

Entering the wrong set point

According to the association of Oil and Gas
Producers (OGP), human factors can be
defined as “the term used to describe the
interaction of individuals with each other, with
facilities
and
equipment,
and
with
management systems.” OGP further states
that “this interaction is influenced by both the
working environment and the culture of the
people involved . . . Human factors analysis
focuses on how these interactions contribute
towards the creation of a safe workplace.
Figure 1 presents the OGP model of human
factors (www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/hf.pdf).
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Figure 1. Human Factors and their Interactions
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HFE begins with the assumption that the human is an integral component of the system rather
than an element to be accommodated after completion of system design. The body of
knowledge of HFE encompasses knowledge of: (1) human capabilities (for example, humans
have good sensory and perceptual capabilities, are adaptive controllers, and can make
decisions and plans of action based on incomplete or evolving information) and (2) human
limitations (e.g., we have poor qualities of endurance and ability to exert forces, we must
operate in highly constrained physical environments, and we are highly variable in our mental
and physical ability and reliability), and (3) methods, principles and data addressing the
application of this knowledge.
The objective of this paper is to illustrate, for designers, operators, managers, and maintainers
of offshore facilities, the methods, tools and techniques that can influence human performance
and error in complex systems. To do this requires an introduction to the objectives and issues
of HFE, as well as an introduction to the body of HFE literature and data that support human
performance and safety design.
Today the methods and data of HFE are being applied to a wide variety of activities and
operations. HFE methods for reducing human errors include (1) the use of established design
standards, (2) reliance on test and evaluation procedures, such as interviewing subject matter
experts, examination of a work sample, experimentation, measurement of human performance
in on-going task sequences, and use of human-in-the-loop simulation (including the training,
knowledge and skills a person need to properly run a system) and (3) investigation of incidents
to understand the causes of human error.
Human error is a major source of risk in existing offshore systems. The International Maritime
Organization and the U.S. Coast Guard have independently estimated that human error is the
direct cause of 80% of ship accidents and incidents. Chadwell et al (1999) investigated the role
of human error in petroleum system incidents and found that in 47% in these incidents, human
error was judged to be a causal or contributory factor. Human error is a leading cause of
incidents which result in loss of life or injury to workers, leading to lost time, and lost capacity to
the company. Human error also leads to financial losses due to lost drilling time, production
downtime, damage to the environment, and unavailability of or damage to systems or
equipment. In many cases of loss due to human error, errors are often related to several key
factors, including external factors such human-machine interface design, design of procedures
and job performance aids, as well as internal factors such as fatigue.
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Modifying existing systems to reduce the potential and impact of human error can be difficult
due to costs and potential interruption of production or drilling operators. These include the
costs of making the modifications, the constraints on the extent to which a system, already
designed and in operation, can actually be modified, and the increased potential for human error
in making procedural changes to a system for which operating personnel have been trained to
follow established procedures.
This paper discusses:

2.0

•

Human performance implications for various classes of human machine interfaces

•

Human performance problems for existing offshore systems

•

A process for applying human factors engineering to reduce the potential for human
error in existing systems

•

Methods and measures for improving human performance in existing systems

HUMAN PERFORMANCE ISSUES BY CLASSES OF HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACES

In its concern for system design, HFE is involved in the design, development, testing and
evaluation of human-machine interfaces. Consistent with the OGP model, divisions of
interfaces can be defined as equipment related, people related, and management systems
related working environment and culture.
2.1

Equipment Interfaces

Equipment interfaces can include: computers, workstations, control panels, buttons, switches
and other types of controls.
Physical interfaces include the physical, structural, and workstation elements with which the
human interacts in performing assigned tasks. Interfaces include:
•

Workstations

•

Control panels and consoles

•

Displays and display elements (screens, windows, icons, graphics)

•

Controls and data input and manipulation devices (keyboards, action buttons,
switches, hand controllers)

•

Labels and markings

•

Structural components (doors, ladders, stairs, hand holds, etc.)

Working Group 3 – HFW2002
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Computing devices should be designed to be usable to the human user. In this context usability
of a system interface refers to extent to which:
•

Human-computer interfaces have been designed in accordance with user cognitive,
perceptual, and memory capabilities

•

Software command modes are transparent to the user

•

Displays are standardized and are easily read and interpreted

•

The user is always aware of where he or she is in a program or problem diagnosis
(situational awareness)

•

On-line help is available and responsive

•

The user is only provided with that information needed when it is needed

•

The user understands how to navigate through a program and retrieve needed
information

For these interfaces the major problems are associated with design approaches that contribute
to human errors and potential incidents (Controls that are not logically organized, ladders at a
severe angle, etc.).
2.2

Management Systems Interfaces

The major organizational issues for this class of interface are the determination of the roles of
the human vs. automation, and the factors that impact the ability of the human to perform
assigned functions and tasks. In modern offshore systems a key component is ”information.”
Interfaces include “organizational” factors and operational factors that manage the flow of
information throughout the system, and maximize the accuracy, timeliness, and usability of
information as set out in a company’s Management Systems. The management of information
has become a major issue for system effectiveness, and the major challenge for system
technology. Problems with information include: excessive information, complex information
handling, non-availability of needed information not available, non-currency of information, and
inaccuracy of information.
Problems for this class of interface include excessive administrative and supervisory workloads,
ineffective organizational lines of authority, and policies that inhibit effective human
performance.
Operational interfaces include:
operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures;
workloads; skill requirements; personnel manning levels; and system response time constraints.
Problems related to operational interfaces include excessive administrative and supervisory
workloads, ineffective organizational lines of authority, and policies that inhibit effective human
performance.
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2.3

People Related Interfaces

Interfaces are primarily concerned with issues such as communication, collaboration, and team
performance. Problems for this class of interfaces include inadequate communications, and
ineffective collaboration and team performance. Communications problems can occur on
offshore platforms and can significantly contribute to human errors. Examples are too noisy to
hear commands/instructions, inadequate communications devices. Offshore systems for which
manning where been reduced will be less capable of employing the strategy of having
supervisors checking operators work, and could result in less operator collaboration to
collectively solve a problem.
People issues also address the cognitive function, operating either collectively as a team or
independently. Components of the cognitive class of human interfaces include:

2.4

•

Decision rules, strategies for formulating and implementing decisions

•

Mental integration of information from several sources and at different times

•

Diagnostic problem solving

•

Short term memory aids

•

Cognitive maps, mental representations of spatial relationships

•

Situational awareness, or understanding what is happening, and the implications for
continued safe operations

Work Environment Interfaces

Work environment includes such factors as noise, lighting and climate.
Environmental Interfaces are concerned with the physical environment (illumination, noise,
temperature, vibration, etc.), workspace arrangement, facility layout and arrangement, and
environmental controls, specifically in terms of how environmental factors contribute to human
performance and safety and health.
The concerns for environmental interfaces are that they induce fatigue and/or distract attention
from the primary task, resulting in increased potential for human error (e.g. glare, noisy
environment where alarms cannot be heard, too tight workspace to adequate remove or work
on equipment).
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3.0

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN ERROR IN EXISTING SYSTEMS

3.1

Human Error as a Contributing Factor to Accidents

It is widely held that human error contributes to 80% of marine casualties and accidents (O'Neill,
1994, McCafferty and Baker, 2002, Baker, et. al., 2002). The Marine Accident Investigation
Branch (MAIB) of the United Kingdom Department of the Environment publishes an annual
report of maritime accidents. For the year 1999, the MAIB noted the relative causal factors of
maritime
fatalities.
Figure
2,
below,
summarizes
their
findings
(http://www.maib.detr.gov.uk/ar1999/04.htm). In this figure, 37% of accidents leading to death
are attributable to human factors. Looking deeper, 25% are attributable to “Working Methods”
and an additional 17% to “Movement about Ship.” In the United States, the Human Factors and
Ergonomics community considers working methods and movement around marine structures to
be within the scope of human factors/ergonomic concerns (e.g., task and vessel design and
procedural practices). As a result, if figures for all of these causal factors are combined, fully
79% of fatalities, as reviewed by MAIB, were related to human factors/ergonomics design
(McCafferty, et. al, 2001).

Figure 2.

Working Group 3 – HFW2002
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While the figures discussed above may seem unduly large, they are not unsubstantiated, nor
are they inconsistent with observations of other studies and other industries:
•

Bea (1994), citing evidence of major claims associated with commercial shipping
during 1993, concludes that human errors that occurred during operations were
responsible for approximately 62 percent of the major claims

•

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported in 1981 that at least 50% of
military system failures are the direct result of human error

•

66% of offshore crane accidents are caused by human error

•

90% of ship collisions (Nations Transportation Safety Board)

•

85% of ship accidents (Navy Safety Center)

•

75% of merchant ship accidents (Germany)

•

66% of marine oil spills (UK)

•

90% of nuclear emergencies (American Nuclear Society, 50% according to the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission)

•

62% of hazardous materials spills (Office of Technology Assessment)

•

65% of all airliner accidents (Boeing)

•

90% of automobile accidents (US Department of Transportation)

Chadwell et al (1999) investigated the role of human error in operating petroleum systems by
analyzing 130 reported incidents. For 47% of these incidents, human error was judged to be a
causal or contributory factor. This 47% was comprised of errors in application of procedures
(20%); errors due to management factors (training, communications, and scheduling) (15%);
random human error (9%); and errors due to facility design factors (controls, environment, and
equipment design) (3%).
The remainder of this section will discuss the nature of human error in terms of error types,
causes, and potential means to wrest control of risk attributable to human error.

Working Group 3 – HFW2002
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3.2

Types of Human Error

Numerous authors (Meister,1971, Woodson, 1981, and Baker, et. all, 2002) distinguish among
different types of human error in terms of the causes of those errors. These classifications
generally include:
•

System-induced errors

•

Design-induced error

•

Human-induced error

System-induced errors reflect deficiencies in the way a system was implemented. They include
mistakes in designating the numbers and types of personnel, in system operating policies, in
training (competency assurance), in data resources, in logistics, in organizational
responsibilities, and in maintenance requirements and support.
Human induced error, according to Meister (1971), are characteristics of people that influence
the potential for errors. These are Meister’s “human-induced errors” and include such factors as
fitness for duty (e.g., fatigue, disorientation, distraction, impaired attention, lack of motivation,
forgetting, complacency, confusion, incorrect expectancy, excessive stress, boredom,
inadequate skills and knowledge, and inadequate or impaired perceptual or cognitive ability).
Such factors can certainly contribute to the occurrence of errors, and in some cases even cause
errors. Recognizing that potential errors are associated with inadequate skills or knowledge,
many employers address this issue in their safety programs with restrictions and specific criteria
for use of "short service employees." Although definitions for short service employees vary,
typically a short service employee may be one new (less than 1 year) to the industry, the
company or to the task being performed.
It must be noted that some HFE professionals view the occurrence of human-induced error as
an effect of design, and not a cause. These practitioners suggest that since no human intends
to fail (or very rarely), then it must be that management system and interface design
characteristics are to blame for human error – after all, the human is only responding to the
system and the design of its interfaces, management procedures, and policy. Whatever
viewpoint is taken, it is important to emphasize that a “blaming culture” is not conducive to
avoiding accidents and incidents.
Design-induced errors result from human incompatibilities with the design of equipment. The
resulting equipment design characteristics create special difficulties for the operator which
substantially increase the potential for error. Examples include inadequate workspace for
maintenance, poor color/contrast of display screens, inadequate labeling of controls and difficult
to reach valve location.

Working Group 3 – HFW2002
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Factors external to the individual can influence the potential for human error. These include the
system-induced and design-induced errors also described by Meister (1971). Elements of the
job or task, design of equipment, operating procedures and training can all affect the potential
for error. Factors related to the design-induced errors can be described as “design factors.”
Factors external to the person for the system-induced class of errors can be designated as
“system factors.” System factors include those aspects of the operational setting, other than
design, which influence human errors. These include: task difficulty, time constraints,
interfering activities, poor communications, excessive workloads, and other factors such as
climate conditions, noise, and vibration.
Design factors include aspects of the system hardware, software, procedures, environment and
training which affect the likelihood of human error. Design factors encompass such aspects of
the system as: human-machine interface design; information characteristics (availability,
accessibility, readability, currency, accuracy and meaningfulness); workspace arrangement;
procedures; environments; and training, etc).
3.3

Characteristics and Causes of Human Error

Examinations of critical incidents leading, to or involving, human error have led HFE specialists
to identify several common characteristics. These include:
•

Situations that can lead to error (infrequent task) generally involve combinations of
conditions (e.g., performing high workload under adverse weather conditions while a
major systems test is being performed) which may seem independent of each other,
and, at other times, directly related

•

There is sometimes an erroneous expectancy on the part of personnel as to what is
happening in the system (inaccurate perception of a situation)

•

Personnel may be under some form of stress

•

There usually exists some degree of complacency on the part of the individuals
involved. (habit – done task many times in past with no consequences)

•

Frequently error situations are the result, at least in part, of the man-machine
interface (MMI) design

•

Many incidents involve a training related issue

The HFE approach to describing human cognitive processes states that humans build up a
cognitive model of the system and the system environment. The extent to which the mental
model is in agreement with the real world is represented by the concept of “conceptual fidelity.”
In a situation of high conceptual fidelity, the human observer is correct in his expectations of
what is happening in the system, what action is required, and how these actions will affect the
system.

Working Group 3 – HFW2002
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In low conceptual fidelity the mental model which the operator has conceived is in basic
disagreement to what is actually happening, and it leads to responses and actions which are
erroneous. Sources of diminished conceptual fidelity include poor human factors design, poor
training, stress, and the past experience of the person involved.
Expectancy also plays a role in the establishment of design conventions, such as that a toggle
switch is moved up to activate, a rotary moves clockwise to increase, and red means danger.
Such conventions form the basis for many HFE standards. Human errors frequently are
attributed to violations of these design conventions.
Personnel committing errors leading to incidents are often under some form of stress. The
errors may be attributed to time stress, psychological stress resulting from the unavailability of
needed information, external stress (e.g., personal issues) and the situation which is actually the
opposite to stress, boredom and resultant relaxation of vigilance.
Investigators of incidents are increasingly aware of the fact that operators of high technology,
complex and sophisticated systems tend to become overly complacent, and show an extreme
level of confidence on reliable system operation. Complacency has been identified by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to be the determining factor in a number of airline
incidents.
The HFE approach to reducing incidents is concerned with prevention of human errors, and
control of human errors once they have occurred. According to Malone et al (1996), it must also
be acknowledged that human errors do, at times, result from slips, lapses, and simple mistakes,
on the part of the human operator; i.e. errors can be traced to personnel as opposed to design
characteristics. Such error situations typically can not be effectively prevented through
improved organizations and designs, since the number of possible error modes is virtually
infinite, and not all error situations can be foreseen.
The importance of HFE for human-induced errors is: 1) to enhance the likelihood that, having
occurred, an error will be detected and corrected in time to avoid serious consequences; 2) to
ensure fitness for duty, defined as assurance that, a person is fully rested, capable, motivated,
and attentive, 3) to reduce the impact of an error on the system and personnel safety and
performance capability by making the system more “error tolerant.” The objective of HFE with
respect to human errors is therefore to prevent error situations by reducing the incidence of
errors; and to control errors by reducing their impact.

Working Group 3 – HFW2002
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3.4

Human Error Offshore

Numerous HFE reviews have been conducted on offshore operations. Based on these reviews,
examples of human performance problems are presented below. When reviewing this sample
of offshore HFE observations, consider them in the context of the characteristics and causes of
human error as discussed in Section 3.3,
•

Mud from mud pits must be sampled every 30 minutes. There is no provision for
obtaining these samples such as sample valves built into the mud pits. It is
necessary to open a hatch at the top of the mud pit and obtain a sample using a
bucket on a line. With frequent sampling, it can be a task that could result in a
person being exposed to hazardous vapors/materials.

•

The weight on a bit gauge presents weight on bit in two different scale resolutions.
The displays are error prone given movement of the block and the service loops.
Some of the weight of the service loops is borne by the drill pipe, resulting in gauge
error for the high resolution weight on bit gauge. The high resolution Information
display seems to be subjected to the greatest amount of display error. It is not clear
why the two scales are offset (zero position), and why is zero not at the 12 O'Clock
position? Nor is it clear what are scale units, and what are the nominal limits
(warning limits)? The weight on bit gauge presents too much information to the
operator, in a confusing manner, while not presenting needed information, such as
the meaning of each scale.

•

The cementer on a rig has problems with dust - when the dust collector fills up,
cement dust is blown all over their room and makes the air unbreathable and
interferes with vision. The dust Collector is a 55 gallon drum that must be
manhandled to a point where it can be emptied. There are no sensors aboard to tell
how full the drum is. The dust requires significant cleanup time as the dust settles on
the controls in the cementers workstation.

•

High noise levels interfere with speech communications. Levels reached 98 dB(a)
resulting in a severe interruption in ability to communicate and a potential for hearing
loss. GaiTronics communications are not used due to noise levels. The operator
uses a Radius P1225 UHF radio headset, which is uncomfortable for long periods of
time, and is incompatible with hardhats.

•

High temperatures are reported in the cementing area. Ventilation is inadequate and
can only be increased by leaving a water barrier door open. This door is supposed
to be closed.

•

Glare problems have been observed on computer displays (e.g., driller screens).
Drillers request that the ship be turned to change the position of sun relative to
Drilling displays.

Working Group 3 – HFW2002
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•

Operating procedures were not provided for the dual turning gear system. The
drillers, assistant drillers, and tool pushers have been working as a team to develop
operating procedures that are generated as they are required. There is no formal
mechanism to verify and validate procedures, nor is there a method to identify what
procedures may be needed in the future. It is possible that a situation could occur in
the future that requires immediate response, and for which no emergency or offnormal procedures will be immediately available.

•

Informal shift handover. No specific process for shift handovers. No specific
formulation of data supporting handover. Objective of formalized shift handover is to
enhance the situational awareness of oncoming shift. It is most important for a
handover for personnel just coming aboard the ship (and less so for those just
coming off a 12 hour rest cycle).

•

Drill room: some communications that seem best handled by verbal communication
are done by hand signals to roughnecks who are outside. Drillers use hand signals,
tap on window to get attention, or go out to drill floor to communicate. The most
significant problem reported by drillers concerns the area of communications
between the drill shack and the roughnecks on the drill floor.

•

On one offshore structure the in-place communications system did not work, and had
not worked since the structure was constructed. In one case, the operator was
observed to leave his workstation in the control room to communicate with the
outside operators on the platform. Hand signals are often used, but are not usually
effective. Hand signals typically only work when there are a few discrete messages
to be communicated, and the signals are unambiguous.

•

Two operators’ workstations are mirror imaged. This will lead to confusion whenever
an operator must move from one station to the other.

•

Alarm levels for the mud storage tanks (running pits) are set at the operators
discretion. Alarm set points can be set for the continuous range of mud level within
the tanks. A decision to set a level too high can result in mud overflows. It is
understood that different alarm levels need to be set depending on the operations at
hand; however, a limit should be set on the highest set point that can be allowed.
This will preclude operators from setting set points at too high a level. It was
reported that in the past several months tank overflows have occurred in the mud pit
area, requiring extensive cleanup of the mud pit floor.

•

A problem with valve access constituted a safety hazard in that users have to stand
on the railing to access the valve.

Working Group 3 – HFW2002
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•

On one platform there was noted an unsafe access to the crane cab. Crane access
required standing on a fixed handrail to access a ladder which goes up to the cab
level. The ladder moves with the crane when it is rotated. The crane operator stated
that this is a problem in that he is not pre-warned that anyone (i.e. maintenance
technician) is accessing the ladder, and may move the crane while that person is
trying to gain access. The handrail on which one must stand was also slippery with
hydraulic fluid, making the activity even more hazardous.

•

Another example of the impact of physical interfaces on error causation is the
reported incident which occurred when, after completing a sampling bore hole to the
desired depth, the drilling crew was in the process of preparing to recover the drill
string when the driller inadvertently operated the wrong control lever. This action
resulted in 892 feet of drill string being dropped to the seabed. Dropping the drill
string resulted from the driller actuating the deck clamp when he thought he was
opening the chuck assembly. This error resulted from poor design and lack of HFE
design principles in the location and layout of the control panel and control levers.
The design of the control panel did not take into consideration the potential for
inadvertent activation and substitution error in selection of these control levers.
Although the controls were physically labeled, the design and layout of the control
panel is not adequate when they are controls requiring blind operation, such as was
required during these task activities.
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4.0

HFE P ROCESS FOR HUMAN ERROR REDUCTION IN EXISTING SYSTEMS

A process for applying HFE methods and data to the reduction of human errors in existing
offshore systems is presented in Figure 3.
A description of the activities associated with each step of Figure 3 is presented in the following
sections.
Analyze Functions
and tasks

Identify Potential
Solutions to Errors

Identify Critical
Functions & Tasks

Model or Mock up
Feasible Solutions

Collect Data on
Critical Error Situations

Select and
Implement Solutions

Analyze for Causes
of Human Error

Evaluate
Solutions

Figure 3.

4.1

Process for Applying HFE Methods and
Data for the Reduction of Human Errors

Step 1 - Analyze System Functions and Tasks

This step begins with selection of a set of operational scenarios which challenge human
performance and safety in system operation. For each scenario system functions will be
identified and analyzed down to the “task” level. Requirements for task performance within the
system will be identified.
Scenarios include representative, typical scenarios as well as worst case scenarios.
Representative scenarios include those which make up the routine activities in the offshore
system. Worst case scenarios include extreme situations where human performance is
challenged by such factors as: tight time constraints, high workloads, high required throughput,
situational factors requiring special procedures, requirements for high rates of communications,
high levels of uncertainty, low levels of participant experience, and large quantities of
information required.
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An analysis of each scenario leads to determinations of: actors (persons participating, including
operators, maintenance personnel, and supervisors), characteristics of actors, objective of the
activities which make up the scenario, events occurring within the scenario, timing of the events
(time expected to conduct activities associated with an event); initial conditions for the scenario,
terminal conditions, interactions among actors, and decisions made during the scenario.
For each scenario a task analysis is conducted to identify task performance requirements
associated with tasks performed by individual actors, and by teams of actors. This analysis
produces a comprehensive array of requirements in the context of the specific scenario.
Requirements may include (as appropriate to each scenario), for each identified task within
each scenario, indications of:
•

Criteria for successful task performance.

•

Expected task duration under the conditions appropriate for the scenario.

•

Limitations on task duration, task initiation time and conditions.

•

Frequency with which the task is performed within the scenario.

•

Information needed for task performance and characteristics of needed information
(source, update rate, quantity, quality).

•

Feedback available on adequacy of task performance.

•

Special knowledge and skill needed to complete the task.

•

Equipment, forms, records, job aids used to perform the task.

•

Decisions required to complete the task, decision rules and decision options.

•

Short term (working) and long term memory required for task performance.

•

Performance tolerances associated with the task.

•

Personnel interactions associated with the task.

•

Communications associated with the task.

•

Error modes - errors which could occur during performance of the task.

•

Consequences of each error mode.

•

Requirements for detecting and correcting errors, for each error mode.

•

Factors that enhance the probability that the error can be avoided.

•

Information that must be recorded to obtain a record of an error occurring for an error
mode associated with each task.

•

Barriers to obtaining the needed feedback on error occurrence.
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The result of the task analysis is a description of task performance requirements. It is strongly
recommended that a multidiscipline team conduct the task analysis. Team make-up can
included operators, maintenance personnel, engineers, supervisors, safety coordinators and
HSE.
4.2

Step 2 - Identify Critical Functions, Tasks, and Conditions

For each scenario critical functions, tasks, and scenario conditions are identified. Critical tasks
and functions are defined as activities or conditions which:
•

Make error detection difficult

•

Make error recovery difficult

Use of predictive tools and techniques are appropriate to identify critical functions, tasks, and
operating conditions. Tools such as Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA),
Hazard & Operability Studies (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis, event tree analysis and others, are
available to support risk analysis during design and operation of a system. The paper authored
by Dr. Johan Hendrikse, et alia (Working Group #2), “Effectively Including Human Factors in the
Design of New Facilities” discusses many of these techniques, as does the paper authored by
Anita Rothblum, et alia (Working Group #1) Improving Incident Investigation through Inclusion of
Human Factors.
Another technique that can be brought to bear on risk issues is the Influence Network (BOMEL
Limited, 2001). An Influence Network is the definition, structure and quantification of a network
of influences affecting the risks associated with human and hardware performance in hazardous
situations. The Influence Network is structured from consideration of a generic set of
influencing factors, which are hierarchically modelled to represent the influence of various
factors such as organizational, management systems and the direct working environment. A
Generic Influence Network (GIN), as shown in Figure 4, is used to draw out the specific
influencing factors that have an effect on any given accident type. This results in a customised
Influence Network which is fully defined in the context of the incident under consideration and
the hierarchy of influencing factors upon the incident.
The incident type being considered could be at any level from a specific event, to a failure of an
individual component or system in an installation or vessel, to the complete industry wide risk
profile. The direct causes of the “top event” can occur as a result of three areas:
•

Human failure

•

Hardware failure and abnormal

•

External events (natural or other party actions)
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Influence Networks can, as is stated above, be used to support predictive / proactive risk
analysis, as well as support the conduct of accident investigation.
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) (Rezende, 2001) is a method for describing tasks in a clear,
unambiguous way, such that there is a understanding of the ways to performing a task. HTA is
a powerful tool in that it can used to assess human risk and error likelihood. HTA can be
considered an extension to “standard” task analysis techniques by increasing the depth of the
error analyses performed. HTA provides the ability to postulate human errors, documents
estimations of consequences of error occurrence, identifies potential actions to mitigate error
effects, and suggests means to reduce error likelihood. A sample HTA is presented as Table 1.
Use of the tools introduced above, and as discussed by Hendrikse, et.al. and Rothblum, et.al.
can be initiated in this step of the process, note however, that these tools have application
throughout this design process.
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Table 1.

Example of a Hierarchical Task Analysis

Task analyses for: Operation in the Liquid Storage Tank System
Task Step
1.1 Operator verifies if
LI indicates tank 1 is
empty

Error Type
C1_Check omitted

C3_Right check on
wrong object

C4_Wrong check on
right object

1.2 Operator verifies if
LI indicates tank 2 is
empty

C1_Check omitted

C3_Right check on
wrong object

C4_Wrong check on
right object

Working Group 3 – HFW2002

Performed by: Ivan

Description

Consequences

Real level is
unknown

Possible more gas
generation when
purging with N2 for 15
minutes.

Sheet No: 01/13
Recovery
Operator will look at
the level when filling
tank (Task step 4.1.1).

Real level in tank-1
is unknown

Training the operator to
get his commitment.
Place LI near Valve A,
then operator can look
LI when operating
valve A.
The name Tank-1 must
be painted near the LI.

Real level in tank-1
is unknown

Real level is
unknown

Error Reduction

Provide a check list to
write hour and level.
Possible more gas
generation when
purging with N2 for 15
minutes.

Real level in tank-2
is unknown

Real level in tank-2
is unknown
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Operator will look at
the level when filling
tank (Task step 4.2.2).

Training the operator to
get his commitment
Place LI near Valve B,
then the operator can
look LI when operating
valve B.
The name Tank-1 must
be painted near the LI.
Provide a check list to
write hour and level.
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4.3

Step 3 - Collect Data on Critical Error Situations

The HFE analysis conducted for each system consists of five major data acquisition activities:
(1) interview of job incumbents and supervisors; (2) review of records (e.g. incidents/near
misses/unsafe acts and behavior); (3) review of the processes in place for recording errors,
near misses and unsafe acts/behaviors; (4) conduct walkthroughs and observations of system
tasks; and (5) determination of the extent to which errors can be expected based on humansystem interfaces implemented in the system.
Personnel Interviews are conducted with job incumbents, supervisors, subject matter
consultants for jobs associated with critical functions, tasks and conditions for scenarios
analyzed in Steps 1 and 2. The interviews will focus on identifying critical incidents where errors
or near misses were observed or could be expected for specific tasks in the scenario based on
such factors as fitness for duty of participating personnel, conditions under which tasks were
performed, and likely causes and contributory factors. The interviews will also address
disincentives of reporting errors, either one’s own errors or those of others, and what incentives
or precautions could be employed to enhance the reporting of errors, such as anonymous
reporting, focus on near misses rather than actual incidents, and reward of employees for error
reporting.
Records Review is focused on a review of records describing actual error or near miss
occurrences and available information describing the event.
Review of Recording Procedures and Materials: an assessment of the techniques in place to
identify and record incidents and near misses for each system. The review will focus on
identified disincentives which would be expected to prevent the identification and recording of
human error situations in offshore systems, such as, for instance, fear of legal action, fear of
license or privileging restrictions, fear of reprisals from supervisors or peers, fear of loss of
career advancement, organizational factors such as the culture and policy which may mitigate
against error reporting.
Conduct walkthroughs: observing performance of tasks associated with selected scenarios in
the actual environment wherein job incumbents proceed step by step through a procedure while
being observed by HFE analysts. This analysis provides input to the task analysis identification
of potential errors associated with individual tasks within scenarios.
Conduct observations/verifications: HFE analysts observe on-going system activities as
described in Step 1, and will identify and record any deviations from standard procedure. In
addition a verification checklist will be completed which will prompt the analyst to verify that a
task has been performed correctly, and that a decision or action associated with a task has
been performed accurately and timely.
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Assessing
human/system/organizational
interfaces:
involves
identifying
the
human/system/organizational interfaces associated with each task in each scenario, and
defining requirements for the interfaces that will promote error-free performance. The
assessment of interfaces associated with each scenario is based on a determination of the
extent to which the interfaces comply with good human factors principles.
Assessing human-machine/equipment interfaces: assessing the extent to which these
interfaces meet appropriate human factors engineering standards and design guidelines. (for
example, making sure that appropriate color coding and prioritization of alarms, proper layout of
a control panel are provided).
4.4

Step 4 - Analyze Causes of Human Error, and Constraints on Error Reduction

Analysis of data in step 3 leads to identified causes of human error and expected error modes,
consequences of errors, requirements for making the system error tolerant, and requirements
for recording the occurrence of the error.
Potential errors will be prioritized in terms of two considerations: (1) severity of consequences
for personnel health and safety, public health and safety, and cost to the owner; and (2)
frequency of the error situation in the system. This approach leads to use of a risk matrix.
As needed, insights into error situations should be developed from reconstruction of identified
error situations judged to be of high priority (serious consequences and/or high frequency).
Reconstruction entail assembling personnel representative of those involved in the error, and
walking through the tasks involved in the error situation, with commentary from participants
concerning what may have contributed to the cause of the error.
The thrust to identify error situations for an offshore system will focus on the following two
activities:
•

Identifying error situations that have occurred through review of incident / near miss
reports, and interviews with system personnel.

•

Identifying error situations that are expected in the future (indications of high error
likelihood) based on the HFE assessment of the adequacy of human / machine /
system interfaces used in specific system operation and maintenance tasks.
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One of the most useful sources of information on human error situations is data on actual
incidents / near miss, recorded in the actual work environment. Such reports should contain
information on precisely what error occurred, what task was the error associated with, what
were the working conditions at the time of the error, what human interfaces were involved, when
was the error discovered, an indication of whether or not it was discovered in time to recover,
what were the causal factors, what were root causes, what were the consequences, and how
was an incident avoided in the case of a near miss.
Barach and Small, in the March 2000 edition of the British Medical Journal, reported that
schemes for reporting near misses (also termed close calls or sentinel or warning events) have
been institutionalized in aviation, nuclear power systems, petrochemical processing, steel
production, military operations, and transportation. Better near miss data can help to identify
human error situations and lead to actions to reduce their occurrence.
The U.S. Coast Guard has attempted to implement an error reporting protocol in its shipboard
operations, and has included in the reporting process the recording of near misses. A near miss
is defined as a situation where an error was prevented or circumvented by some action on the
part of the operator or other personnel. The Coast Guard noted that near misses are some 60
times more frequent than actual errors, and they can provide the same insight into error etiology
as actual errors, without the stigma of having to report on one’s own or an associate’s mistakes.
The root causes of each identified error situation should be identified or at least postulated by a
review of the error situations. In a similar fashion, factors that may have contributed to the error
or near miss will also be identified. Root Cause analysis tools include TapRooT, SCAT,
TRIPOD BETA, etc. These tools will assist in identifying Performance Influencing Factors. The
paper by Dr. Anita Rothblum of Working Group #1 “Improving Incident Investigation through
inclusion of Human Factors” provides a comprehensive coverage of the tools and techniques in
the area of accident, incident, and near miss analysis and reporting. Another technique that can
be used to help identify root causes is the Influence Network (BOMEL Limited, 2001) which is
discussed in Section 4.2.
In the analysis of incidents sometimes participants have expectations about what is happening
and why, and these expectations are not always accurate. People can build up an erroneous
mental model of what is happening in the situation, based on faulty or incomplete evidence, and
this leads them to act inappropriately. Stress is also usually cited as a cause of human errors.
Error situations of the type expected in offshore systems can result from people forming an
incorrect mental model from incomplete or ambiguous information which can, result in
erroneous expectancy, manifested in decisions and actions that are wrong. The solution to this
problem is to provide complete, accurate, reliable, timely and valid information concerning the
operational situation, which will enable development of a mental model which conforms with
reality.
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In terms of the impact of psychological stress, in critical incidents, the level of stress generally
varies as a direct function of the extent to which the human understands the situation, and what
to do about it. The HFE approach is to intensively analyze the functions, tasks, conditions, and
decisions required, identify information requirements and information processing and display
needs, and ensure that humans are provided with the proper information and knowledge to
correctly complete a task.
Innovations in technology have led to the use of advanced automated systems on modern
maritime vessels. However, bridge automation has also changed the role of the watch officer
on the ship. The watch officer, who previously was active in obtaining information about the
environment and used this information for controlling the ship, is now “out of the control loop”
and is in more of a monitoring mode.
The primary constraints on error reduction include:
•

Costs of redesign and modification of existing structures and system components

•

The need to modify procedures and training systems to reflect the changes to
equipment

•

The possibility of negative transfer of training when operators must be retrained to
operate modified control systems

Constraints on solutions for identified error situations will be defined prior to the selection of
specific solutions.
4.5

Step 5 - Identify Potential Solutions to Errors

The objective in this step is to minimize 1) chance that the error will occur and 2) reduce the
consequences if the error does occur. Making systems more error tolerant reduces the impact
of human error. This process involves determining what human errors will have serious
implications for crew/operator safety, and designing techniques to either promptly alert the
operator that an error has occurred and how to correct it; or to enable the system to continue to
operate safely until the error is recognized and corrected.
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Potential solutions will include:
•

Reengineering of the allocation of functions to humans and machines. (example
manual handling of sacks of chemicals to an automated conveyor system).

•

Redesign human-machine interfaces (push button instead of switch, light indicating
alarm instead of a gauge, additional information shown on hazards in control
screen).

•

Modifications to procedures and systems documentation (e.g., clarify procedure
steps, one action per step, include warnings/precautions in procedure).

•

Modifications to training content or to training systems.

•

Provision of instructions, advisories, warnings (signs and labels).

The HTA tool discussed in section 4.2 can be used to support the task of identifying solutions to
human error potential.
According to Miller (1999), an order of preference to mitigate human error and its possible
effects is as follows:

4.6

•

Redesign interfaces (where possible)

•

Provide guards

•

Provide training

•

Revise procedures

•

Provide warnings, markings, and labels

Step 6 - Model the Feasible Error Solutions

Selected error solutions can be modeled to assess human performance with the solution. An
example would be for control system redesign where the new design could be modeled on a
simulator and reviewed with operators to determine the effectiveness of the new design.
Task network modeling involves modeling the operation of a human-machine system as a
network of tasks. Tasks are assigned in a fixed or variable manner to selected operators which
often represent humans but can also represent machines or other resources. The time taken to
perform each task is modeled as a random variable having a specified probability distribution.
Task sequence relationships can be probabilistic so that various contingencies can be
represented as occurring with specified probabilities. Task network simulation tools use Monte
Carlo methods to sample probabilistic task sequencing and distributions of task time. Time and
accuracy data can be obtained for a baseline configuration of the system, and after installation
of the error reduction solution.
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The human-machine system models that result can have considerable flexibility and can
represent real-world scenarios. When the model is run, the program records statistical data
such as the numbers of completions of tasks, the time spent per task per operator and total
busy/idle time per operator.
Human-in-the-loop simulation techniques and usability testing can focus on cognitive,
information processing and decision making aspects of human performance. If a simulation test
subject receives specified information via a monitor, reaches a decision and then makes a
response via a data entry device, the response time and accuracy of the response can be
determined. Human performance with human-machine interface representations from the
baseline system and with the addition of error reduction solutions can be directly compared.
Over a number of trials, statistical data can be obtained on errors, magnitude of errors and
response time.
4.7

Step 7 - Select and Implement Solutions

This step addresses how error reduction solutions can be selected and implemented into an
existing system. The following should be considered in selected solution(s):
•

Overall human performance capability

•

Human workload (especially cognitive workload)

•

Additional human performance or safety problems caused by the solution

•

System error tolerance

•

Operating and support costs

•

Training burden

•

System manning

•

Compliance with government regulations

•

Compliance with HFE standards including astm-1166, and ABS HFE standards

•

Personnel safety

A plan and time schedule should be develop for implementation. There should be a follow-up
process to monitor the progress (against plans) and effectiveness (reduction in incidents/near
misses, unsafe acts/behaviors) of the selected solutions. Management of change processes
should be followed necessary.
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4.8

Step 8 – Evaluate Solutions

The key point for this discussion is that evaluations should be conducted for human factors
initiatives. These evaluation assessments should include analysis of:
•

Personnel functions, processes and performance

•

Human interfaces, including equipment, procedures, job aids, and communications,
teamwork, etc.

•

Training, including new hire, refresher, special, and contractor

•

Personnel fitness for duty, including physical health, freedom from stress and fatigue

Appropriate groups (inducing engineering, safety, purchasing, maintenance, operations, policy,
and human factors) should have input and be award of changes. This is essential since
changes under the purview of one group likely will have implications for HF. For example,
equipment replacements (by engineering personnel) may spawn new or different requirements
for training and design of operational and maintenance procedures. Changes in operating
policy will likewise influence training. Further, human factors personnel can participate in
engineering tradeoffs by supporting selection of new equipment, or by helping to devise
solutions other than engineering. Those that are personnel related should also be reviewed for
implications to training, job aids, and workload/job design. Changes in personnel onboard a
platform, including contractors, personnel rotations, shift work, or tour rotations necessitate
ensuring that safety is maintained during these changeovers. Finally, changeovers in
management such as company or platform acquisition, restructuring of a company or the
acquisition or loss of personnel directly responsible for safety personnel should be considered
as it affects safety.
Most organizations and theorists would agree that changes to the design and operation of a
system must included segments which require both investigations of incidents and some means
of soliciting the opinions and comments of the workers affected by those changes. Also within
the area of HF, evaluation is directed at elements such as: personnel training, environmental
control, design of human-equipment interfaces, protective gear, maintenance and assessment
of personnel readiness/fitness for duty, communications (organizational, operational, and
maintenance), maintenance and usability of procedures/job aids, and operating practices,
procedures, and policies.
Specific HFE considerations in evaluations should include:
•

Is there a need to change or modify the approach of the solutions chosen?

•

Have all HF disciplines been considered (e.g. HF Engineering, Process Safety and
Behavioral Science)?
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5.0

EXAMPLE ACTION PLANS FOR IMPROVING HUMAN PERFORMANCE ON EXISTING
SYSTEMS

Section 4 presented a general approach for integrating HFE data into systems design. This
section provides specific guidance addressing the improvement of the following HFE issues:
•

Communications (Table 2)

•

Labels and signs (Table 3)

•

Procedures and job aids (Table 4)

•

Information Transfer and Display (Table 5)

•

Human machine (Table 6)

•

Training (Table 7)

•

HFE Issues (Table 8)

Process guidance is presented in Tables 2 through 8.
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Table 2.

Sample Process for Improvement of Communications

Objectives. The objectives of this activity are to analyze communications in terms of
communication links and how communications are made, and to recommend modifications to
the communication systems.
Worksteps
Step 1. Analyze communications in terms of the links, frequency, information importance, and
environmental conditions under which communications are made. (e.g., noise level)
Step 2. Generate a link analysis of communications requirements among various stations
(e.g.,, control rooms outside stations).
Step 3. Identify conditions that can potentially interfere with speech communications and
speech intelligibility. (e.g., noisy equipment)
Step 4. Conduct a communications “error analysis” to identify, for selected links,
communications requirements, environmental conditions, potential errors, error criticality, and
causal and contributory factors.
Step 5. Develop communications criteria, including standard message format and syntax, links
and modes of communications among stations, to reduce error likelihood and improve
communications accuracy.
Step 6. Survey communications devices meeting requirements that are not in place (for
example, use of noise canceling technology).
Step 7. Make specific recommendations concerning improved communications system design
based on assessments of the capabilities of state-of-the-art communications devices.
Step 8. Prepare HFE design specifications for communications (e.g., noise levels, types of
communications, location of communication devices, etc.)
Step 9. Perform speech intelligibility testing under realistic conditions.
Step 10. Generate an implementation plan and a cost estimate for implementing the
Communications Systems specification and recommendations.
Products. The products of this activity will be a series of recommendations and design
specifications related to communications hardware and software, human-machine interfaces,
message format and syntax, a list of constraints associated with communications (e.g.,
ambient noise), and a plan and cost estimate to implement the communications system
recommendations.
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Table 3.

Sample Process for Improvement of Labels and Signs

Objectives. The objectives are to develop and implement standards for labeling and marking
of operating components. These include Controls, displays, pipes and valves, major
equipment and associated operating components.
Worksteps
Step 1. Survey color coding and other conventions used by company.
Step 2. Survey general offshore coding conventions.
Step 3. Review applicable standards and guidelines related to design of labels and signs and
other identifying markings in industrial applications, from HFE literature, Industry conventions,
and ASTM-1166.
Step 4. Establish a specific Labels and Signs Standard. This Standard should address the
following:
•

Content

•

Wording and nomenclature

•

Colors, fonts, and other detailed characteristics

•

Method of affixing to components labeled

•

Style guides for warnings and cautions

•

Consistency with written documentation, procedures, and computer display
nomenclature

•

Method of generation of labels and markings (engraving for example)

Step 5. Develop list of required signs and labels.
Step 6. Develop a label consistent with the labeling standard, for all components specified.
Step 7. Assist in having manufactured the labels and markings.
Step 8. Monitor installation of the levels and markings.
Step 9. Verify and validate: All labels and markings installed undergo a verification and
validation step.
Products. The products of this activity include:
•

A platform- specific “Style Guide” and standard for labels and markings.

•

Procedures for specifying and acquiring levels, markings and warning placards.

•

Procedures for verifying had and validating the content and accuracy of labels,
markings, and placards.
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Table 4.

Sample Process for Improvement of Procedures/Job Aids

Objective. The objective of this activity will be to specify requirements associated with
generation of operating and maintenance procedures and job aids. Specific objectives include:
• Identification of required procedures based on failure modes effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA) or similar analysis.
• Identification of required procedures based on routine and normal operating and
maintenance requirements.
• Generation of procedures style guides.
• Generation of written procedures based on the style guides and requirements.
Worksteps
Step 1. Identify normal operating procedures that are used in the conduct of normal and routine
drilling operations.
Step 2. Identify abnormal or emergency operating procedures. These will be identified via
failure modes and effects and criticality analyses, or similar, and on a historic events and
situations that have been realized in offshore drilling.
Step 3. Survey coding information presentation conventions. Survey general offshore
procedures design conventions.
Step 4. Review applicable standards and guidelines related to design of procedures.
Step 5. Establish procedures writing guide. This standard will address procedure:
•

Content, wording and nomenclature

•

Colors, fonts, and other detailed characteristics

•

Information mapping and decision making

•

Style guides for stepwise activities

•

Style guides for embedded warnings and cautions

•

Consistency with labels and marking

•

Standardized vocabulary

•

Storage, update, and accessibility

•

Use as part of team and individual training

Step 6. Develop protocol for verifying and validating procedures as they are written.
Step 7. Assist in writing procedures.
Step 8. Verify and validate - all procedures undergo verification and validation step.
Products. The products of this activity include:
•
•

•

Procedures writing guide
List of applicable procedures, normal and abnormal operations
A complete set of written procedures, verified and validated
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Table 5.

Sample Process for Improvement of Information Transfer and Displays

Objectives. The objectives of this task are as follows:
•

Define information requirements per job/location

•

Define a representative sample of information items

•

Identify information formats

•

Design screen layouts and user-computer interfaces per formats

•

Define data base requirements

•

Prepare information transfer specification

Worksteps
Step 1. Define Information Requirements per Job/Station Information requirements will identify
the information items needed at each location for a given job. For example, a mud logging
station needs mud pump on/off and valve open/closed information. In this case, any additional
information items would need to be identified.
Step 2. Define a Representative Sample of Information Items Information items from step 1 will
be reviewed to establish a representative set of items for further analysis. This step cannot be
performed in total independence of step 3 because the intent will be to identify classes of
information items and a representative sample of specific items per class. Steps 2 and 3 will be
performed in parallel and iterated as required.
Step 3. Identify Information classes and formats for workstations, individual information items
will be categorized to identify a number of information classes. Each such class will eventually
be represented as an information object in an object oriented data base so definition of object
attributes in a data base will need to be considered in defining the classes. Information
classes/objects could include message, scheduled event, pump, valve, motor, sensor, BHA
component and others as necessary.
Step 4. Design Screen Layouts and User-computer Interfaces per Formats Each information
class will have unique attributes and will require a standard format for display of the attributes.
User-computer interfaces will also be required for searching the data base and selecting object
attributes to be continuously displayed. Users should not have to learn complex query
languages to access information.
Step 5. Define Data Base Requirements Information from the above steps including object and
attribute characteristics and user-computer interface functionality will be collected and
documented in a data base requirements and concepts document.
Step 6. Prepare Information Transfer Specification Information from the above steps including
object and attribute characteristics and user-computer interface functionality will be collected
and documented in an information transfer specification document. The difference between the
data base requirements document and the information transfer specification will be that the
former is aimed at providing information for software system procurement while the latter will be
aimed at developers and users.
Products. The primary products of this task will be the data base requirements and concepts
document from step 5 and the information transfer specification from step 6.
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Table 6.

Sample Process for Improvement of Human/Machine/Interfaces

Objectives. The objectives of the task described in this SOW are as follows:
•
Define a representative sample of existing HFE issues.
•
Identify applicable design criteria and guidelines.
•
Identify candidate HFE design improvements.
•
Select HFE design improvements.
•
Design and document improvements.
•
Develop HMI interface specification.
Worksteps
Step 1. Define a Representative Sample of HFE Issues associated with human machine. The
intent will be to identify issues and potential solutions for HFE issues associated with human
machine interfaces.
Step 2. Identify Applicable Design Criteria and Guidelines: Design criteria and guidelines will be
proposed. Ideally, the selected design criteria and guidelines will be applied to new operator
interfaces in the future.
Step 3. Identify Candidate HFE Design Improvements Candidate improvements to operator
interfaces will be developed for each HFE issue from step 1 using the applicable design
guidance from step 2. Where required, two or three candidates could be developed for each
HFE issue. Definition of candidate improvements will require user input.
Step 4. Select HFE Design Improvements: Candidate improvements from step 3 will be
compared on the basis of cost, expected effectiveness and breadth of application on future
ships. The set of recommended improvements will be selected using these data.
Step 5. Design and Document Improvements The selected HFE design improvements from step
4 will be designed in detail and documented using descriptions, specifications and graphics
sufficiently that they can be implemented.
Step 6. Develop HMI Interface Specification The applicable design criteria and guidelines will be
incorporated into an interface specification document suitable for future use in ship design.
Applicable design criteria from step 2 will be incorporated and the documentation of the specific
improvements from step 5 will be included to provide examples.
Products. The primary products of this task will be the selected HFE improvement concepts
and designs from step 5 and the HMI interface specification from step 6.
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Table 7.

Sample Process for Improvement of Training (individual and team)

Sample Process for Improvement of Training (individual and team)

Objectives. The objectives of this task are as follows:
• Identify jobs and tasks for improved training methods.
• Develop training objectives/conduct task analysis
• Identify performance and skill requirements
• Identify training media
• Develop training materials
• Train to criteria and test skill acquisition
Worksteps
Step 1. Identify Jobs and Tasks for Improved Training Methods : Criteria for selection of jobs
and tasks will include the frequency with which the tasks must be performed, the likelihood of
operator error and the severity of the consequences of operator error. Tasks that must be
performed frequently in daily operations provide opportunities for effective OJT and for
extensive operator practice. Many error modes that exist currently are readily detectable and
correctable by the operator and errors on these tasks have little or no consequences; it is
infrequent performance and nondetectable and noncorrectable error modes that will drive the
selection of tasks for improved training.
Tasks that have the properties of infrequent performance and severe consequences of error are
often those associated with emergency response to equipment failures or other abdominal
events. The fact that performance is infrequent means that knowledge and skills associated
with these tasks are “degradable” over time.
Results of Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA) or other analysis will be required in this
task. The target tasks would then be those necessary to recover from or to mitigate the results
of credible events postulated in the FMEA.
Step 2. Develop Training Objectives and conduct Training Task Analysis: Training objectives
describe observable and verifiable behaviors that operators should exhibit given necessary
information. Training objectives usually involve making correct decisions and taking correct
actions following receipt of information about the system, the environment, etc. As related to
FMEA events, the decisions involved would be to correctly diagnose the state of the equipment
and the environment. The action should be the correct one to rectify or mitigate the effects of
the failure or abdominal event that has occurred. A training task analysis should be conducted
to identify tasks, conditions, events, information required by the operator, decisions and actions
required of the operator and other relevant task descriptors, and needed knowledge and skills to
enable performance of the task. This is also sometimes called a “critical task analysis” in that
the focus is on the highly important tasks rather than on all tasks. Critical tasks, then, do not
necessarily result only from major failures but also from abdominal events that call for critical
tasks to be performed. Training objectives will be defined for the tasks identified in step 1.
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Sample Process for Improvement of Training (individual and team)

Step 3. Identify Performance and Skill Requirements : Performance refers to measurement of
trainee progress in demonstrating mastery of the training objectives. This can range from an
indication that the trainee has completed a given module to performance in problem solving
exercises or simulations. The intention of any training program is to impart knowledge skills, and
abilities (KSAs). In some cases these elements can be treated separately in that knowledge
acquisition often involves presentation of factual knowledge and testing involves assessment of
acquisition. Skills and abilities usually refer to application of knowledge to problem solving.
Certain skills and knowledge may be common across a number of jobs so it may be effective to
split out bodies of training materials into modules. Training for a given job then consists of
common modules required for the job and job specific modules. Skills, knowledge and
performance measurement requirements will be identified. Specific criteria for pass/fail
thresholds should be specified.
Step 4. Identify Training Media Training media can be books, overhead slides, CD ROMs,
embedded training incorporated into applications software, desk-top simulations, etc. Based on
the outputs of step 3, a preferred medium or media will be identified for each training objective
and the performance measurement necessary to assess mastery of the objective.
Step 5. Develop Training Materials Training materials include the paper, slides, graphics,
tapes, computer presentations and other audio and/or visual elements viewed or heard by the
student. Training materials will be developed by:
•

Preparation of an outline for each module

•

Preparation of written contents using subject matter expert inputs

•

Development of a story board for each module

•

Preparation of the materials including text, graphics, animations, simulations etc.

•

For computer based training, development of courseware (using course authoring
software where necessary)
Step 6. Train to Criteria and Test Knowledge Skill Acquisition The initial application of the
training content and materials from the above steps will be tested in the training course(s).
Performance measures will be used to identify common errors or failures to master material on
the part of students, and to determine how to modify the training materials. Following any
necessary modifications, the resulting course(s) will then be ready to be used to train the
required audience.
Products. The primary products of this task will be the training materials. (courses, manuals,
CDs, etc.)
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Table 8.

Sample Process for Improvement of HFE Issues

Objective. The objectives of this task are as follows:
•
Identify tasks and areas with potential HFE issues
•
Define standardized work environmental limits
•
Identify safety hazards
•
Identify design factors for improved HFE
•
Define specific actions
•
Prepare HFE specifications
Worksteps
Step 1. Identify Jobs and Areas for Design of Improved Work Environment and Safety A sample
of tasks and areas will be selected for further analysis based on HFE issues. This sample will
represent extremes in terms of ambient noise, temperature, humidity, illumination, safety related
equipment design factors and mechanical hazards. Examples on a drilling rig could include the
cement and shaker areas and the engine and fan rooms.
Step 2. Define Standardized Work Environmental Limits: Various standards sources provide
guidance on acceptable work environmental limits. These will be used to define a set of
proposed limits for work environments.
Step 3. Identify Safety Hazards Representative safety hazards will be identified for facilities and
equipment that are involved in the tasks and areas from step 1.
Step 4. Identify Design Factors for Improved HFE potential solutions to be considered will
include elimination of the hazard, elimination of human access, barriers and guards, redesign,
warning labels, barriers and guards, procedures and special training. For each safety hazard
from step 3, a preferred approach will be defined and documented.
Step 5. Define Specific Actions: Treatments of factors that exceed the limits established in step
2 will include design approaches such as noise attenuation at the source, noise attenuation at
the ear, enhance ventilation and cooling, protective clothing and fixed or portable additional
lighting. The effectiveness of alternate solutions on of environmental factors that exceed the
limits from step 2 will be assessed.
Step 6. Prepare HFE Specification The rationales and results from the previous steps will be
incorporated into a HFE specification document. This may be applicable to design of work
environment and safety improvements on a current project as well as future projects.
Products. The primary product of this task will be the HFE specification from step 6.
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6.0

VERIFICATION OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE ON EXISTING SYSTEMS

Table 9 presents a listing of some potential verification measures of human performance. Not
all measure may be applicable to a particular facility or project.
Table 9.

Potential Verification Measures of Human
Performance on Existing System

Evaluate the Assigned Role of the Human in Automation
•

Verify that each system function is allocated to human or machine or a combination of
the two.

•

Verify that the role of the machine in manual tasks is defined.

•

Verify that the role-of-human in automated tasks is defined.

•

Determine that operator workloads are realistic.

Evaluate Training Concepts
•

Verify that the training analysis addresses training requirements based on job
requirements.

•

Verify that the training analysis addresses all requirements for training devices, trainers,
and part task and full task simulators.

•

Verify that training requirements are identified in time to allow for development of any
new training devices (such as simulators).

•

Verify that the analysis addresses lessons learned from similar system training
evaluations.

Evaluate Training Concepts
•

Verify training requirements include specific knowledge and skills to be acquired.

•

Verify training requirements include criteria for judging skills are learned.

•

Verify that training requirements include performance measures.

Evaluate Human Machine Interface Requirements
Evaluate Human-Machine Interface (HMI) Design
•

Verify that standardization and commonality are addressed in the design of humanmachine interfaces.

•

Verify that unique human interface requirements, documentation needs, and special
software certifications are identified.

•

Verify that characteristics of automated decision support systems are identified.

•

Verify that human workloads and human performance requirements are assessed
through human performance and task modeling, task network simulation, and humanin-the-loop simulation.
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•

Verify that human engineering design standards are applied to reduce human error
potential.

Evaluate Design for Operability :
•

Verify operator performance capability has been demonstrated.

•

Verify that details of the design are consistent with standards.

•

Verify that error likelihood analyses have been performed to identify types of
performance errors associated with the design approach.

•

Verify that operational procedures have been developed.

•

Verify that control and display arrangements are based on sequence of use, priority
and functional grouping.

•

Verify that panels and consoles are designed to be maintainable.

•

Verify that warnings are provided for hazardous operations/maintenance actions.

•

Verify that panels are operable when operators are wearing protective clothing.

•

Verify that work environment effects (e.g., noise, lighting, climate) have been
considered in the design.

Evaluate Design for Usability
•

Have information requirements been identified?

•

Have major HFE deficiencies been identified that might compromise understandability
or effectiveness of the proposed displays?

•

Have user needs been identified?

•

Is the design of human-computer interfaces complete?

Evaluate Communications Concepts
•

Verify that sufficient communication devices and systems have been provided for all
communication requirements.

•

Verify that communications system designs are based on link analyses and operational
sequence analyses.

•

Verify that speech intelligibility evaluations have been conducted

•

Verify that message samples, noise conditions, and device fidelity are acceptable in
terms of HFE standards.

•

Verify that messages are standardized and are based on constrained language,
controlled syntax, and restricted vocabulary.

•

Verify that user clothing conditions were considered.

•

Verify that the range of potential environments (especially noise and vibration) were
considered in design of communications.
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Evaluate Design for Habitability
•

Have facility human functions and associated facility requirements been identified?

•

Has the design effort identified access safety requirements?

•

Have requirements for inhabiting the facility been identified?

•

Verify that environmental controls are included in facilities (e.g., noise, lighting climate).

Evaluate Design for Maintainability
•

Does design for maintainability include requirements for maintenance information
requirements?

•

Does design for maintainability include design for accessibility?

•

Does design for maintainability include equipment arrangement to facilitate
maintenance?

•

Does design for maintainability include procedures-number and simplicity?

•

Does design for maintainability include troubleshooting diagnostics and decisions?

•

Does design for maintainability include built in test and automatic test equipment?

•

Does design for maintainability include requirements and approaches for tools and test
sets?

•

Does design for maintainability include requirements and approaches for equipment
identification and marking?

Evaluate Design for Safety
•

Have hazards previously identified been eliminated or the associated risks reduced to
an acceptable level?

•

Are approaches for guarding the hazard adequate?

•

Are approaches for labeling the hazard adequate?

•

Are approaches for alarming the hazard adequate?

•

Are approaches for safety training/procedures adequate?

Evaluate Installations
•

Have equipment location requirements been identified?

•

Has space layout for equipment installation been identified?

•

Have equipment configuration requirements been identified?

•

Have access/egress requirements been identified?

•

Has an HFE design evaluation been conducted?
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Evaluate HFE inputs to Change Proposals (ECPs)

7.0

•

Have HFE lessons learned been identified for the element?

•

Have critical tasks per function been identified?

•

Have human machine interfaces been identified?

•

Have task requirements been identified and analyzed?

•

Has HFE test and evaluation been conducted to identify problems and/or validate
lessons learned data?

•

Has the role of human vs. automation been evaluated?

•

Have workloads been evaluated?

•

Have procedures been evaluated?

•

Have effects of use environments been evaluated?
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